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작성자  simonshin 작성일  2017.01.02 19:08 조회수 1106 추천 0
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 신현근 박사 강의안: 환상의 개념에 관한 프로이트와 클라인의 견해  
첨부파일 : f1_20170102190833.pdf
 

과목: 무의식적 환상의 역할

주제: 환상의 개념에 관한 프로이트와 클라인의 견해

강사: 신현근 박사

내용: 강의안

교재: Spillius, E.B. (2001). Freud and Klein on the Concept of Phantasy. Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 82:361-373.

 Freud and Klein on the Concept of Phantasy

 

1.       Overview

1.1.     One of Freuds earliest discoveries was that in the unconscious, memories and phantasies are not distinguished - hence his abandonment of his earliest theory of neurosis, the ‘seduction’ or ‘affect trauma’ theory.

1.2.     From that time onwards phantasies have been of central interest.

 

2.       Freud’s views

2.1.     Freud’s central usage

2.1.1.  One of the difficulties in expounding the diferences between Freuds and Kleins views on phantasy is that Freud uses the term rather differently in different places.

2.1.2.  In ‘Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning’, which is where he comes closest to making a formal definition, he speaks of phantasy as a wish-fulfilling activity that can arise when an instinctual wish is frustrated.

2.1.3.  Phantasies derive ultimately from unconscious impulses, the basic instincts of sex and aggression.

2.1.4.  I shall call that Freuds central usage.

2.1.5.  In understanding Freuds central usage it is important to remember that his idea of phantasy, like his work on dreams, is closely bound up with the development of his topographical model of the mind.

2.2.     Repression

2.2.1.  Although Freud thought that some unconscious phantasies might be ‘unconscious all along’, he thought that most phantasies originated as conscious or preconscious daydreams and might subsequently be repressed.

2.2.2.  As he puts it in ‘Hysterical phantasies and their relation to bisexuality’, the unconscious phantasies of hysterics ‘have either been unconscious all along and have been formed in the unconscious; or—as is more often the case—they were once conscious phantasies, day-dreams, and have since been purposely forgotten and have become unconscious through “repression”’ (1908, p. <a href="http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=se.009.0155a#p0160" target="_blank">160</a>).

2.2.3.  In Freuds view the basic motive force for phantasy formation is an unconscious wish that is blocked from fulfilment, and the phantasy is a disguised expression and partial fulfilment of this unconscious wish.

2.2.4.  If phantasies are formed in the system conscious or if they are allowed into it—that is, if they are daydreams—they are known not to be true.

2.2.5.  If they are formed in the system preconscious or if they are repressed into it, they will be descriptively unconscious but formed according to the everyday logic of the secondary process.

2.2.6.  If phantasies are further repressed into the system unconscious, they become subject to the peculiar logic of the primary process and from their position in the system unconscious they may become indistinguishable from memories and may also find their way into dreams, symptoms, symptomatic acts, further preconscious and conscious phantasies, and other drive derivatives.

2.3.     Unconscious instinctual wish vs unconscious phantasy

2.3.1.  In Freuds view, although there are phantasies in the system unconscious, the basic unit of the system unconscious is not phantasy but the unconscious instinctual wish. 

2.3.2.  Dream-formation and phantasy-formation are parallel processes; one might speak of ‘phantasy work’ as comparable to the ‘dream work’; both involve transformation of primary unconscious content into a disguised form.

2.3.3.  For Klein, on the contrary, unconscious phantasies are the primary unconscious content, and dreams are a transformation of it.

2.3.4.  For Freud, the prime mover, so to speak, is the unconscious wish; dreams and phantasies are both disguised derivatives of it.

2.3.4.1.  For Klein the prime mover is unconscious phantasy.

2.4.     Emphasis on contrasting aspects of the word phantasy

2.4.1.  I think that Freud and Klein emphasised contrasting aspects of the everyday usage of the word phantasy.

2.4.2.  The word conveys contrasting implications both in English and I believe also in German.

2.4.3.  It has a connotation of the imagination and creativity that underlie all thought and feeling, but it also has a connotation of make-believe, a daydream, something that is untrue by the standards of material reality.

2.4.4.  Freuds central usage emphasises the fictitious, wish-fulfilling aspect of the everyday usage, whereas Kleins usage tends to focus on the imaginative aspect.

2.5.     Diverse usage of the word

2.5.1.  But this relatively clear-cut contrast between Freud and Klein is complicated by the fact that<a name="p0363"></a> Freuds ‘central usage’ is not by any means his only usage.

2.5.2.  Further, he moves easily from one implied definition to another without being finicky about his formulations.

2.5.2.1.  In some of his early work he seems at times almost to equate unconscious phantasy with unconscious wish; at others he speaks of phantasies largely as conscious or preconscious day-dreams .

2.5.2.2.  In his clinical work he deduces phantasies of quite surprising content, phantasies of which the patient has presumably been unaware.

2.6.     Primal phantasies

2.6.1.  It seems likely that Freud always tacitly assumed that at least some phantasies may originate directly in the system unconscious without being originally preconscious or conscious derivatives of unconscious wishes.

2.6.2.  Indeed in 1916 he speaks of primal phantasies, which he thinks are inherited; these are the phantasies of the primal scene, of castration, of seduction by an adult.

2.6.3.  Most of Freuds followers have not adopted this view, presumably because they think it too Lamarckian.

2.6.4.  But with some alteration I think it is not far away from Kleins notion of inherent knowledge of bodily organs, birth and intercourse (1927, pp. 175-6), or from Bions idea of ‘preconceptions’ waiting to combine with experience to form conceptions (1962ab).

2.6.5.  In French psychoanalysis, these primal phantasies are considered to be of fundamental significance both in theory and in clinical work (Roussillon, 1998).

2.7.     Summary

2.7.1.  Freud is not punctilious in his definition of phantasy.

2.7.2.  He uses the term in several senses and, as Laplanche & Pontalis point out, he is more concerned with the transformation of one sort of phantasy into one another than with any static definition (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, pp. <a href="http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=ipl.094.0001a#p0314" target="_blank">314-19</a>).

2.7.3.  What I have called his ‘central usage’, however, is that one that has been adopted by most of his immediate followers.

 

3.       Klein’s view

3.1.     Unconscious along

3.1.1.  Basically, Klein focuses on the ‘unconscious all along’ aspect of phantasy.

3.1.2.  She regards phantasy as a basic mental activity present in rudimentary form from birth onwards and essential for mental growth, though it can also be used defensively.

3.1.3.  Klein developed this view of phantasy through her work with children, especially through discovering that children accompanied all their activities by a constant stream of phantasy even when they were not being frustrated by external reality.

3.2.     Development of the ideas

3.2.1.  Klein developed her idea of phantasy gradually from 1919 onwards, stressing particularly: the damaging effect of inhibition of phantasy in the development of the child; the ubiquity of phantasies about the mothers body and its contents; the variety of phantasies about the primal scene and the Oedipus complex; the intensity of both aggressive and loving phantasies; the combination of several phantasies to form what she called the depressive position (Klein, 19351940)—the paranoid-schizoid position was to come later, in 1946—the development of phantasies of internal objects and, of course, the expression of all these phantasies in the play of children and the thinking and behaviour of adults.

3.2.2.  Essentially, I think that Klein viewed unconscious phantasy as synonymous with unconscious thought and feeling, and that she may have used the term phantasy rather than thought because the thoughts of her child patients were more imaginative and less rational than ordinary adult thought is supposed to be.

3.2.3.  Further, Klein thought that it was possible to deduce the phantasies of infants from her analyses of small children, assuming that she was discovering the infant in the child much as Freud had discovered the child in the adult (Britton, 1995).

 

4.       Controversial Discussions

4.1.     So important was the concept of phantasy in Kleins thinking that the British Society made it the central scientific topic of the Controversial Discussions of the nineteen forties (King & Steiner, 1991), the aim of the discussions being to see whether Kleins ideas were to be regarded as heresy or development.

4.2.     It was Susan Isaacs, however, who gave the definitive paper, ‘The nature and function of phantasy’, first given in the Discussions, then published in revised form in 1948 and 1952.

4.3.     In this paper Isaacs stressed the link between Kleins concept of phantasy and Freuds concept of drive.

4.4.     She defined phantasy as ‘the primary content of unconscious mental processes’, ‘the mental corollary, the psychic representative, of instinct’ (1952).

4.5.     Phantasies are the equivalent of what Freud meant by the ‘instinctual representative’ or the ‘psychic representative of an instinctual drive’.

 

5.       Kleinian view

5.1.     Isaacs, like Klein, particularly emphasises the idea that everyone has a continual stream of unconscious phantasy, and, further, that abnormality or normality rests not on the presence or absence of unconscious phantasy but on how it is expressed, modified and related to external reality.

5.1.1.  She distinguishes between conscious and unconscious phantasy and suggests the ph spelling to distinguish the latter.2

5.1.2.  Isaacss and Kleins definition of phantasy is thus much wider than Freuds central usage.

5.2.     In the Kleinian view, unconscious phantasy is the mainspring, the original and essential content of the unconscious mind.

5.2.1.  It includes very early forms of infantile thought, but it also includes other forms that emerge later on in development through change in the original phantasies.

5.2.2.  Also, as described by Freud, some unconscious phantasies may start off as conscious daydreams or theories that are later repressed.

5.2.3.  But, unlike many of Freuds successors, Klein does not think that repression of once conscious daydreams is the only or even the main source of unconscious phantasies.

5.2.4.  Freuds central usage, the wish-fulfilling definition of phantasy, is a specific and more limited form, a particular type of phantasy within Kleins more inclusive definition.

5.3.     In the Controversial Discussions Klein and Isaacs did not stress this relation between their all-inclusive definition and the wish-fulfilling definition of phantasy as a particular type within it.

5.3.1.  Certainly the argument in the Discussions was made more difficult by the fact that each faction was using the same word for a different concept; much of the time the two factions talked past each other.

5.3.2.  Ronald Britton (1998) has suggested that Isaacs probably did not fully clarify the difference in definitions because she did not want to emphasise Kleins difference from Freud, for Klein and her colleagues were worried that Glover might succeed in banishing them from the Society on the grounds that they differed from Freud and were therefore not ‘legitimate’.

5.4.     Early infantile thought

5.4.1.  Freud is not very specific in making conjectures about the nature of early infantile thought.

5.4.2.  Klein called such thought phantasy and assumed that it was closely linked to bodily experience.

5.4.3.  She assumes that phantasising starts very early, in some primitive form ‘from the beginning’.

5.4.4.  She did not bother much about Freuds distinction between the system unconscious and the system preconscious, between primary- and secondary-process thinking.

5.4.5.  Klein and Isaacs assumed that phantasies could be formed according to primary-process thinking—indeed, that primary- and secondary-process thinking were very much intertwined.

5.5.     Isaacs assumes that the earliest phantasies are experienced mainly as visceral sensations and urges, the other senses of touch, smell, sound, taste and sight being added later and gradually.

5.5.1.  Such unconscious phantasies can perhaps be regarded as similar to the ‘thing presentations’ that Freud describes in ‘The unconscious’ (1915b).

5.5.2.  Isaacs makes much use of the principle of genetic continuity to link these very early phantasies with the more structured verbal phantasies of the older child and the adult.

5.5.3.  She assumes that what is experienced is a sensation and an impulse, together with a feeling of something happening that is involved with the sensation and may have an effect on it; looked at from the perspective of an outside observer, the ‘something’ is some aspect of external reality.

5.5.4.  From the perspective of the infant, things are assumed to be inside him.

5.6.     Hinshelwood describes it as follows:

5.6.1.  An unconscious phantasy is a belief in the activity of concretely felt ‘internal’ objects.

5.6.2.  This is a difficult concept to grasp.

5.6.3.  A somatic sensation tugs along with it a mental experience that is interpreted as a relationship with an object that wishes to cause that sensation, and is loved or hated by the subject according to whether the object is well- meaning or has evil intentions (i.e. a pleasant or unpleasant sensation).

5.6.4.  Thus an unpleasant sensation is mentally represented as a relationship with a ‘bad’ object that intends to hurt and damage the subject …

5.6.5.  Conversely, when he is fed, the infants experience is of an object, which we can identify as mother, or her milk, but which the infant identifies as an object in his tummy benevolently motivated to cause pleasant sensations there (1989, pp. 34-5).

5.7.     Through introjection and projection a complex phantasy world of self and internal objects is slowly built up, some of it conscious, but reaching to the unconscious depths.

5.7.1.  This notion of internal objects and the internal world was and has continued to be central in Kleinian thought.

5.7.2.  This internal world is imaginary by the standards of material reality, but possesses what Freud calls ‘psychic’ reality—that is, to the individual concerned it feels real at some level, conscious or unconscious, and it is also real in the sense that it affects his behaviour.

5.7.3.  It is noteworthy too that in the unconscious aspects of the internal world Klein and Isaacs think of phantasies as combining both ideas and feeling—another difference from Freud, who spoke of the system unconscious as the realm of ideas and memory traces and was never entirely resolved about the status of unconscious feelings.

5.8.     Early phantasies are omnipotent: ‘I want it, Ive got it’. ‘I dont want it, its gone!’

5.8.1.  They are stated by Isaacs to have many attributes Freud thought to be characteristic of the primary process—no co-ordination of impulses, no sense of time, no contradiction, no negation.

5.8.2.  But Klein also thought of unconscious<a name="p0366"></a> impulses and phantasies being in conflict with each other in the unconscious; unconscious conflict between love and hate, between a good self and a bad self, between a good parent and a bad parent were conceptions she found appropriate and useful, though in Freuds topographical conceptualisation wishes (and wishful phantasies) in the system unconscious are in conflict not directly with each other but indirectly through their contact with the regulating ego.

5.9.     Kleins discoveries about the phantasies of small children led her to be very aware of their intense bodily concreteness, their concern with birth, death, the primal scene, babies, faeces, urine, murderous hatred and equally violent love.

5.9.1.  Her descriptions of phantasies are as graphic and surprising as those of Freud.

5.10. Klein’s followers

5.10.1.      Nowadays, like our classical colleagues, many Kleinian analysts have become more cautious about interpreting phantasies so boldly and so concretely (see Spillius, 1988, pp. 8-9, 1994).

5.10.2.      In spite of this change, I think that emphasis on the unconscious and on adult forms of living out infantile experiences and phantasies has remained characteristic of Kleinian analysis.

5.10.2.1.             Like Klein herself, her present-day followers take it for granted that in thinking, in dreaming, in creativity, in all experiencing there is a constant and often uncomfortable mixture of logic and illogic.

5.10.2.2.             Further, unconscious phantasy is the mainspring of both creativity and destructiveness.

5.10.2.3.             It gives meaning to the external world and richness to the internal world.

5.11. Klein and Isaacs assume that the expression of unconscious phantasy in words comes very much later than their original sensory formulation.

5.11.1.      Indeed, in current Kleinian thought it is assumed that some unconscious phantasies about infantile experience are never formally articulated in words, though words may be the means unconsciously used to communicate them by evoking them in an external person.

5.12. Klein and Isaacs assume that phantasies affect the perception of external reality, but, equally, that external reality affects phantasies, that there is a continual interplay between them.

5.12.1.      This assumption—namely, that actual external events are interpreted and understood, experienced in other words, in terms of pre-existing phantasies, and that phantasies may be modified to take experience of events into account is a basic premise in Kleinian thought.

5.12.2.      It comes, for example, into the Kleinian idea that the infant gradually develops the more realistic thinking of the depressive position (Klein, 19351940Segal, 1964) alongside and partially replacing the omnipotent thinking of the paranoid-schizoid position (Klein, 1946), although each infant and each adult will have their own characteristic realisation of the two forms of thought in the particular content of their phantasies.

5.13. The first part of Kleins idea about the interaction of phantasies and external events, namely, her idea that external events are interpreted and understood in terms of pre-existing phantasies, caused considerable argument during the Controversial Discussions and subsequently as well, for many analysts disputed Kleins assertion that an infant or child could have, say, attacking and destructive phantasies without having been destructively attacked.

5.13.1.      In the Kleinian view such phantasies of attack may conceivably be a realisation of a hereditary disposition, though they may also arise from earlier experiences of bodily sensations of discomfort, as described above in the quotation from Hinshelwood.

5.13.2.      External reality thus often operates not only as a stimulus or cause of phantasies but as a confirmation or disproof of them.

5.13.3.      The argument about which are primary, pre-existing phantasies and which are external events is an expression of a more general, and in my opinion unproductive, psychoanalytic argument about the relative priority of heredity and environment—unproductive because the relevant psychoanalytic evidence for deciding the issue in particular cases, especially direct evidence about the past, is usually not available.

5.14. Klein and Isaacs assume that phantasies are not used solely to express unconscious impulses and wishes.

5.14.1.      Mechanisms of defence too are expressed through phantasy. 

5.14.2.      Projection, introjection, splitting, idealisation, denial, repression are abstract terms that describe general psychic processes, but a given individuals use of them is expressed through a particular phantasy.

5.15. Phantasies expressing particular impulses and defences do not operate in isolation.

5.15.1.      Gradually some of them may build up into a complex system that involves the individuals own unique way of being, of relating to the world, of maintaining his balance.

5.15.2.      The concept of phantasy is thus central to the idea of the organisation of the personality as a whole.

5.15.3.      This is the main sense of the term ‘unconscious fantasy’ favoured by Arlow (1969ab1995), by Shane & Shane as global fantasies (1990) and by Inderbitzin & Levy (1990).

5.15.4.      Kleinian usage includes such central or ‘global’ phantasies but does not confine the general term to such particular sorts of phantasy.

 

6.       The fate of the concept of phantasy after the Controversial Discussions

6.1.     It is hardly surprising that in the Controversial Discussions of the nineteen forties Anna Freud, Glover and their associates were not convinced by Isaacss arguments, nor she by theirs.

6.2.     As I have said, they meant such different things by the same term, phantasy, that they were talking past each other. Since 1943 the differences<a name="p0368"></a> of definition and usage have continued, though most of the heat has gone out of this particular debate.

 

<a name="ijp.082.0361a.h00002"></a><a name="h00002"></a>7.       Later Kleinian developments

7.1.     Kleinians’ changes in their definition and use of the concept of phantasy have been minimal.

7.1.1.  Considering that Kleinians regard unconscious phantasy as such an important concept, it is perhaps surprising that little has been written about it since Isaacs’ original paper. (But see Segal 1964, 1994; Joseph 1981; Hinshel-wood, 1989; Britton, 1995.)

7.1.2.  I think so little has been written because the concept is now taken for granted.

7.1.3.  Many of the developments in Kleinian thought have used the concept of phantasy without changing Kleins view of it.

7.1.4.  Much of the work on the development of thinking, for example, uses the idea of changes in the content and functions of phantasy in the movement from the paranoid-schizoid to the depressive position, as I have briefly described above.

7.1.5.  Bion takes the concept of phantasy for granted in describing the model of the container and the contained and its role in the development of thinking (1962b).

7.1.6.  Similarly, much of the work on psychic equilibrium and on pathological organisations uses the concept of phantasy, especially in the course of describing the relevant clinical material (Riviere, 1936; Rosenfeld, 1971; Segal, 1972; OShaughnessy, 1981; Joseph, 1982; J. Steiner, 1993). 

7.1.7.  Phantasy comes into everything.

7.2.     Although Kleins successors have thus made little fundamental change in her concept of phantasy, they have in my view made three minor changes.

7.2.1.  More emphasis on the role of phantasy in the development of logical thought

7.2.1.1.  P hantasies are now viewed by Kleinians as crucially important in the development of logical thought since they may be used as hypotheses to be confirmed or disproved by experiences of external reality, an idea implicit in Kleins thought but explicitly added to the Kleinian conception of phantasy by Hanna Segal (1964, 1994).

7.2.1.2.  The testing of phantasies against reality does not mean that earlier more omnipotent phantasies are necessarily abandoned; they remain but are added to by more sophisticated versions in keeping with experiences of external reality.

7.2.1.3.  Also, often the more sophisticated versions are used to deny the continuing psychic reality of the cruder and perhaps earlier phantasies (Segal, 1994; Britton, 1995).

7.2.2.  A change in the language used to describe unconscious phantasies to the patient

7.2.2.1.  As I have briefly mentioned above, many Kleinians have become more cautious about using part-object anatomical language in describing to certain patients the content of unconscious phantasies (Spillius, 1988, 1994).

7.2.3.  More emphasis on the enactment of phantasies by the patient in the analytic situation

7.2.3.1.  In describing clinical material there has been a tendency to devote attention not only to the symbolic content of phantasies but also, and increasingly, to the way they are lived out in the session.

7.2.3.2.  This has been a notable trend in the highly influential work of Betty Joseph (1989).

7.2.3.3.  I shall now give an example of the enactment of an unconscious phantasy.

7.3.     It is clear that in the Kleinian view, unconscious phantasy is really synonymous with the content of the unconscious mind.

7.3.1.  That was one of the objections that Glover, Anna Freud and others made to Kleins usage: all mental functions were encapsulated into this one concept.

7.3.2.  Of course it is clear that all analysts, regardless of school of thought and regardless of their definition of the concept of phantasy, use the idea of unconscious thoughts and feelings.

7.3.3.  In Kleinian analysis such thoughts and feelings are called unconscious phantasy; in classical analysis<a name="p0370"></a> they are called drive derivatives, and the term phantasy is used only for one particular form of drive derivative.

7.3.3.1.  But the conception of unconscious thoughts and feelings occurs in all schools of analysis.

7.3.4.  Perhaps the importance of the Kleinian notion of unconscious phantasy, overall, is that it has tended to keep the attention of Kleinian analysts even more focused on unconscious anxieties and defences than is the case in other schools of psychoanalytic thought.

 

<a name="ijp.082.0361a.h00003"></a><a name="h00003"></a>8.       Later independent views on phantasy

8.1.     The concept of phantasy has not been central in the thinking of psychoanalysts of the Independent group, but Harold Stewart thinks that Independent analysts have made an important contribution to it by stressing the particular importance of actual external experiences in contributing to patients’ phantasies (Stewart, 1992, also personal communication).

8.2.     This is in keeping with the general Independent stress on the importance of actual external events in shaping the internal world.

 

<a name="ijp.082.0361a.h00004"></a><a name="h00004"></a>9.       Later Contemporary Freudian views

9.1.     Contemporary Freudians, as described above, use Freuds central definition of phantasy. 

9.2.     Joseph Sandler has been especially interested in the definition and use of the concept of phantasy (Sandler, 1986; Sandler & Nagera, 1963).

9.2.1.  He and his wife, Anne-Marie Sandler, have constructed a model of the mind involving what they call the past unconscious and the present unconscious (Sandler, 1983; Sandler & Sandler, 1984, 1986, 1987, and particularly 1994, 1995), which corresponds roughly to Freuds System Ucs. and System Pcs. of the topographical model, in which the concept of unconscious phantasy is most at home.

 

<a name="ijp.082.0361a.h00005"></a><a name="h00005"></a>10.    Phantasy in Continental and especially French psychoanalysis

10.1. The idea of unconscious phantasy is particularly important in French psychoanalysis, especially the primal phantasies of the primal scene, seduction, castration and also the Oedipus complex.

10.2. This emphasis on unconscious phantasy has not occurred because of British or Kleinian influence but because of interest in Freud, especially perhaps the earlier Freud of the topographical model.

 

<a name="ijp.082.0361a.h00006"></a><a name="h00006"></a>11.    Phantasy in American psychoanalysis

11.1. It is my impression, though there are many exceptions to this (especially Jacob Arlow), that less attention is paid to manifestations of unconscious phantasy or of the unconscious in general in American psychoanalysis than in British and Continental analysis.

11.2. The American Psychoanalytical Association held a panel on unconscious phantasy (Inderbitzin & Shapiro, 1989), with papers by Shapiro (1990), Trosman, (1990) Abend (1990), Shane & Shane (1990), Dowling (1990) and Inderbitzin & Levy (1990).

11.2.1.      This was the first panel on the topic for many years and in it Shapiro (1990) specifically remarked that the concept of phantasy had been neglected.

11.3. I think that such neglect is perhaps encouraged by the structural model of id/ego/superego, which focuses attention on conflict between these three conceptualised agencies of the mind and on the defences and adaptations of the ego.

11.3.1.      The two distinctions of conscious/unconscious and primary/secondary process, which cut across each other and which are so important in Freuds characterising of different types of phantasy, also cut across the id/ego/superego classification, which does not provide a natural ‘home for unconscious phantasy.

11.3.2.      Of course, the concept of unconscious phantasy is clinically useful, essential even, and talented clinicians have found ways of focusing attention on it even though the structural model tends to discourage focus on the dynamic unconscious.

11.4. Although yet again there are exceptions (e.g. Shane & Shane, 1990) it seems to me that decreasing focus on unconscious phantasy is even more apparent among self-psychologists, intersubjectivists and relational analysts than among other sorts of American psychoanalyst.<a name="p0371"></a>

11.4.1.      Presumably this decreased emphasis on the unconscious of the analysand occurs because it is felt that the interpersonal perspective on both the analytic relationship and the analysands personal history offers a more cogent understanding of personality, normal as well as pathological, than do the concepts of unconscious phantasy and, more generally, of conflict between conscious and unconscious.

11.4.2.      I do not see any logical reason why the interpersonal focus should necessarily tend to exclude the unconscious, but empirically it does seem to be so.

 

<a name="ijp.082.0361a.h00007"></a><a name="h00007"></a>12.    Summary

12.1. In summary, I think Freuds idea is that the prime mover of psychic life is the unconscious wish, not phantasy.

12.1.1.      The ‘work’ of making phantasies and the ‘work’ of making dreams are parallel processes in which forbidden unconscious wishes achieve disguised expression and partial fulfilment.

12.1.2.      For Freud himself, especially in his central usage, and even more for his immediate followers, phantasies are conceived as imagined fulfilments of frustrated wishes.

12.1.3.      Whether they originate in the system conscious or the system preconscious, they are an activity of the ego and are formed according to the principles of the secondary process.

12.1.4.      That is not the whole story, however, because phantasies may get repressed into the system unconscious, where they become associated with the instinctual wishes, become subject to the laws of the primary process, and may find their way into dreams and many other derivatives.

12.1.4.1.             For Freud and for French psychoanalysts particularly, there are the primal phantasies, ‘unconscious all along’, of the primal scene, castration and seduction, also capable of being directly incorporated into dreams and expressed through other derivatives.

12.2. For Klein phantasy is an even more central concept than for Freud and it has continued to be used by her successors with only minor changes.

12.2.1.      In Kleins thinking unconscious phantasies play the part that Freud assigned to the unconscious wish.

12.2.2.      They underlie dreams rather than being parallel to them—a much more inclusive definition of phantasy than Freuds.

12.2.3.      The earliest and most deeply unconscious phantasies are bodily, and only gradually, with maturation and developing experience through introjection and projection do some of them come to take a verbal form.

12.2.4.      Freuds central usage, the wish-fulfilling definition of phantasy, is a particular type of phantasy within Kleins more inclusive definition.

12.2.5.      And, as in Freuds formulation, conscious phantasies may be repressed, but in Kleins formulation this is not the only or even the main source of unconscious phantasies.

12.2.5.1.             In Kleins usage, unconscious phantasies underlie not only dreams but all thought and activity, both creative and destructive, including the expression of internal object relations in the analytic situation.

12.3. Finally, it is my tentative suggestion that conceptual and clinical focus on the concept of phantasy, especially unconscious phantasy, as in Britain and France, tends to involve a heightened awareness of the unconscious—hardly surprising, since unconscious phantasy is such a fundamental aspect of the unconscious.

12.3.1.      I have suggested that, although there are many individual variations, the structural model and the self-psychology, relational and intersubjectivist models tend to discourage focus on the dynamic unconscious.

 

 
 
 
 
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