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작성자  simonshin 작성일  2017.01.12 14:42 조회수 1173 추천 0
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 신현근 박사 강의안: 무의식적 환상과 현대 갈등 이론  
첨부파일 : f1_20170112144302.pdf
 

과목: 무의식적 환상의 역할

주제: 무의식적 환상과 현대 갈등 이론

강사: 신현근 박사

내용: 강의안

교재: Abend, S.M. (2008). Unconscious Fantasy and Modern Conflict Theory. Psychoanal. Inq., 28:117-130.

                                           Unconscious Fantasy and Modern Conflict Theory


1.     Abstract

1.1.   This article traces the evolution of the concept of unconscious fantasy from its origins in Freuds early clinical writings to its place in the theory and practice of modern conflict theory. The central role played by Arlows clarification of the ubiquitous influence of unconscious fantasy life on aspects of normal mental functioning such as perception, memory, thinking, and reality testing is highlighted. Some contemporary clinical applications of our understanding of unconscious fantasies are added to the long familiar awareness of its role in symptom formation.

 

2.      Importance of the concept of unconscious fantasy

2.1.   In preparing this review of the role of the concept of unconscious fantasy in modern conflict theory, I reaffirmed my previous conviction that it remains an essential foundation stone of our theoretical edifice, and that it continues to occupy a central position in the technique of analyzing intrapsychic conflict.

2.2.   It is somewhat surprising that this key element of psychoanalytic thought has persisted with only rather minor refinements for so many years.

2.3.   Speaking as one who is comfortable wearing the label of Freudian traditionalism, I find it reassuring that I can even now revisit what Freud, and such respected teachers as Kris, Arlow, Rangell, and Brenner have said about unconscious fantasy (not to mention what I myself have written on the subject) and still feel as convinced of the validity and utility of the ideas expressed in those papers as when I first encountered them.

 

3.      Freud’s contributions

3.1.   In 1894, in his paper on “The Neuropsychoses of Defense,” Freud mentioned that not only experiences and feelings, but also ideas that a person finds incompatible with his or her ego could be rejected from conscious awareness and become the seeds of later neurotic afflictions.

3.2.   By the time of Freuds publication of the Dora case (1905a), however, he spoke with assurance on the subject of unconscious fantasy: “A symptom signifies the representation—the realization—of a phantasy with a sexual content, that is to say, it signifies a sexual situation. It would be better to say that at least one of the meanings of a symptom is the representation of a sexual phantasy” (p. <a href="http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=se.007.0001a#p0047" target="_blank">47</a>). He went on to describe the analysis of Doras cough as derived from imagining oral sexual activities between her father and Frau K.

3.3.   For now, I will ask you to return to 1905, when Freud published “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality” (1905b).

3.3.1.      His elaboration of infantile sexuality sets forth in detail the normal range of chilhdhood fantasies about the sexual act, pregnancy and childbirth, and the anatomical differences between the sexes. He considered these ideas to be a universal aspect of childhood mental life and he saw them as inevitably subject to repression. Thus, these products of childhood imagination turn into unconscious fantasies that are of crucial significance in psychological development.

3.3.2.      It is sufficient for our present purpose to recognize that Freud, by this time, had established unconscious fantasy life in an essential position in his theory of both normal and pathological development, as well as having assigned it an important place in the technique of psychoanalytic treatment of the pathological conditions.

3.4.   In Freuds subsequent monumental shift from the earlier topographic model of the mind to its successor, the structural one, he continued to assign a central role to the part played by certain fantasies of childhood.

3.4.1.      The difficulty analysts have, even today, in helping patients gain access to these fantasies, not to mention the degree of controversy they have aroused in subsequent debates about Freudian theory, offer evidence in support of Freuds contention that these fantasies are subject to repression early in childhood.

3.4.2.      He was convinced, and, based on years of accumulated clinical experience, Freudian analysts ever since have remained equally certain that these fantasies persist in an unconscious form, exerting their determinative influence on normal and pathological development.

3.5.   Before we leave the subject of Freuds utilization of the concept of unconscious fantasy in his body of work, it is worthwhile to mention a late career emendation to Freuds theory of technique that, it seems to me, has implications for the potential importance of unconscious fantasies as factors in pathogenesis. I

3.5.1.      In his 1937 paper, “Constructions in Analysis,” Freud made the point that successful analytic work need not invariably result in the conscious recapturing of repressed memories of past experiences. Instead, he observed, “Quite often we do not succeed in bringing the patient to recollect what has been repressed. Instead of that, if the analysis is carried out correctly, we produce in him an assured conviction of the truth of the …[analysts]…construction which achieves the same therapeutic result as a recaptured memory” (p. <a href="http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=se.019.0265a#p0265" target="_blank">265-266</a>).

3.5.2.      This made a place in technique for the therapeutic value of the analyst inferring the presence of, then reconstructing and interpreting, certain repressed unconscious fantasies, without requiring for confirmation that the patient must subsequently recapture the memory of once having consciously entertained the fantasy involved.

3.5.3.      A sense of conviction on the part of the patient might be achieved by the preponderance of subsequent analytic material that fit the pattern of the reconstruction.

3.5.4.      Years later, Kris gave a vivid description of how such reconstructive analytic work might look in On Some Vicissitudes of Insight in Analysis(1956). He talked of segments of analysis “when over a stretch of time the<a name="p0120"></a> analyst can piece together some of the slight elevations in the patients productions as they reveal outlines of a larger submerged formation” (p. 256).

3.6.   Finally, in our evaluation of Freuds contributions to establishing the role of unconscious fantasies in theory and technique, it is helpful to note that he never systematically revised many of the ideas that he formulated during the years when his topographic theory held sway in order to make them more consistent with the implications of his later structural theory.

3.6.1.      Thus he never resolved questions about the precise nature of unconscious fantasy life, treating the fantasies primarily as if they were merely distorted versions of instinctual wishes belonging to the system Ucs.

3.7.   Freud was aware of certain inconsistencies in his theoretical structure, in fact he acknowledged the theoretical conundrum posed by unconscious fantasies in his 1915 paper, The Unconscious, in a passage cited by Arlow (1969) when he took up the issue later on. Freud (1915) said:

3.7.1.      Among the derivatives of the unconscious instinctual impulses…there are some which unite in themselves characters of an opposite kind. On the one hand they are highly organized, free from self-contradiction, have made use of every acquisition of the system Cs., and would hardly be distinguished in our judgment from the formations of that system. On the other hand, they are unconscious and are incapable of becoming conscious. Thus qualitatively they belong to the system Pcs., but factually to the Ucs… of such a nature are those fantasies of normal people as well as of neurotics which we have recognized as preliminary stages in the formation both of dreams and of symptoms and which, in spite of their high degree of organization, remain repressed and therefore cannot become conscious [pp. <a href="http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=se.014.0159a#p0190" target="_blank">190-191</a>].

3.8.   Although greater emphasis was now placed on the descriptive and dynamic qualities of the unconscious stratum, rather than on the former systemic distinctions, Freud did not pursue the full implications of this important change in order to clarify the status of unconscious fantasy life. Thus, it remained a task for Arlow, whose 1964 collaboration with Brenner, “Psychoanalytic Concepts and the Structural Theory,” took up the precise question of reformulating earlier Freudian concepts in the light of later theorizing, to try to make consistent sense of those problematic aspects of the concept of unconscious fantasy.

 

4.      Arrow’s contributions

4.1.   In “Unconscious Fantasy and Disturbances of Conscious Experience,” Arlow (1969b) stated unequivocally that our “understanding of the role of unconscious fantasy has been hindered greatly by drawing too sharp a distinction between conscious and unconscious” (p. 4). He relied on the idea expressed some time earlier by his friend and frequent collaborator, Brenner (1955), that different mental contents are fended off from consciousness with a greater or lesser measure of countercathectic force. Arlow went on to say that “ease of accessibility of a particular mental representation to consciousness may vary” (p. 5). Thus the line of demarcation between daydream and unconscious fantasies, in Arlows opinion, is less important than had been previously thought. He went on to elaborate a sophisticated view of the ways in which unconscious fantasies influence various aspects of conscious experience.

4.1.1.      Arlow made a particular point that conscious and unconscious fantasy activity is a constant feature of mental life. He suggested that we should speak of unconscious fantasy function (emphasis added), rather than unconscious fantasy, precisely to highlight the ubiquitous, continuous nature of unconscious fantasy activity, and to underline its omnipresent influence on the surface phenomena of mental life.

4.1.2.      Consistent with the ideas of Freud, Arlow proposed that unconscious fantasies tend to be clustered around certain basic instinctual wishes, affording a measure of wishful gratification. Different versions of related fantasies can appear at different developmental stages, he thought, but Arlow made clear that the fantasies invariably include defensive components as well as superego elements, along with the important wishes they contain. He demonstrated that unconscious fantasies influence mythology and metaphor, as well as symptom formation and other psychic phenomena.

4.1.3.      Perhaps most important, in this paper Arlow began to explicate the idea that unconscious fantasy function always interacts with and influences the data of perception. He summed up this point as follows: “Unconscious daydreaming is a constant feature of mental life. It is an ever-present accompaniment of conscious experience. What is consciously apperceived and experienced is the result of the interaction between the data of experience and unconscious fantasying as mediated by various functions of the ego” (p. 23). He presented a number of clinical examples illustrating this principle in operation in such situations as déjà vu, parapraxes, and disturbances of the sense of self.

4.2.   In the second paper he published in the same year (1969a), “Fantasy, Memory, and Reality Testing,” Arlow extended his ideas about the influence of unconscious fantasy function to include its impact on reality testing and memory. He suggested that the minds perceptual apparatus should be conceived of as an active version of the translucent screen in his famous visual model. He proposed that the perceptual apparatus continuously monitors external data (that is to say, what we ordinarily think of as perceptions), and simultaneously is also always receiving internal stimuli, by which he meant not only the long familiar notion of somatic signals, but also the pressure exerted by unconscious fantasies.

4.2.1.      The task of reality testing thus amounts to the operation of those mental activities involved in distinguishing external “facts” from internal “fantasies.” Arlow was quick to point out that defining reality testing in this way was not an original idea of his, citing, among others, Hartmann (1956). Arlows emphasis was the perhaps underappreciated constant state of impingement on perception from internal sources, thus underlining that the struggle to achieve reliability in reality testing is a perpetual challenge for everybody.

4.2.2.      Memory, too, falls into the category of mental functioning subject to shaping by unconscious fantasy. Here Arlow cited Freuds paper on “Screen Memories” (1899) as already making this point. Arlow called attention to the unavoidable conclusion that all memory, whether we speak of its form at the time of the original encoding of current experience, or about each subsequent occasion of its recall from the storage capacities of the mind, it is affected by unconscious fantasy function, as well as by the objective reality of what transpired. This helps to explain how memories revisited at various stages of the individuals development, or even at different moments during the course of an analysis, can be construed in quite different<a name="p0123"></a> ways. Presumably the so-called external facts are always the same, but alterations in the relevant unconscious fantasies that interact with, and thereby modify the way that these data are experienced, accounts for varying emphases, additions, deletions and changes in interpretation of the contents of the memories in question.

4.3.   It cannot be too strongly emphasized that it was precisely the phenomenon that Arlow explicated that would, not long after his papers on the subject appeared, energize the psychoanalytic subjectivists epistemological criticism of positivism. What is all the more striking about this observation is the fact that Arlow himself apparently never applied the subjectivists conclusion about the inevitable limitations on the reliability of the analysts objectivity to himself, and to his own view of technique, even though he was well aware of the usefulness of attending to the analysts inner musings, fantasies, and associations in the ongoing effort to understand analysands productions! It seems likely to me that, at least in part for that reason, Arlow never quite received full recognition for the value of his contribution by the advocates of the subjectivist position.

4.4.   Arlow was but one among many mainstream analysts who demonstrated the usefulness of applying the concept of unconscious fantasy to the task of deciphering the meaning of a number of clinical phenomena, and to revealing the psychodynamic underpinnings of many issues in applied psychoanalysis, including jokes, mythology, literature, religious beliefs and certain artistic creations as well. A few analysts (Boesky and myself among them), have tried to outline some criteria for the reliable identification of the presence of particular unconscious fantasies in patients analytic material. Boeskys case material permitted him to illustrate the familiar evidentiary principles of context and contiguity, and of the convergence of multiple sources of comparable or similar data into comprehensible coherence. I added the observation that the analysts preferred theoretical orientation always shapes his or her understanding, and that his or her cumulative experience with each analytic patient contributes greatly to the analysts sensitivity to the unconscious contributions to the surface material in any given hour or segment of that patients analysis.

 

5.      Current status of the concept in the theory and practice

 

5.1.   Now I shall try to outline the current status of the concept of unconscious fantasy in the theory and practice of psychoanalysis from the vantage point of modern conflict theory. I shall make no attempt to integrate the rather different views of unconscious<a name="p0124"></a> fantasy life that have been proposed by Kleinian theorists over the years, nor to enter the debates on the subject that arose between mainstream Freudians and their Kleinian counterparts.

5.2.   I will begin by referring to Rangells (1988) emphasis on unconscious fantasy as “an intermediate product” (p. 61).

5.2.1.      They take the form of compromise formations incorporating drive wishes and their modifications by defensive alterations and superego input.

5.2.2.      At the other end of the chain in which they appear are the “final psychic outcomes” (Rangell, 1988, p. 61), that is to say the observable surface phenomena of symptoms, character traits, moods, and the like.

5.2.3.      He called unconscious fantasies “way stations,” when seen from either one of two directions.

5.2.4.      Going forward, “they play a role, either transiently or in a more enduring form, in the dynamics of character development and symptom formation, as well as in external action and behavior” (p. 61).

5.2.5.      Operationally in the course of analytic practice, they are encountered in what might be considered a retrograde direction, appearing as intermediate links in the successful unraveling of the underlying unconscious conflicts that lie behind the observable surface of analytic material.

5.3.   In my view, analysts treat unconscious fantasies as more than mere abstract conceptual tools; we tend to regard them as concrete entities in patients minds whose presence we first infer, then detect, and finally reconstruct.

5.3.1.      We start from the patients presentation of analytic material, which we automatically tend to classify as symptoms, character traits, moods, wishes, defenses, interests, predilections, adaptations, and so on, in whatever form they appear. 

5.3.2.      Dreams and daydreams, memories, accounts of contemporary or past events, and associative responses to the analytic situation, including the analysts comments, are all subject to this scrutiny and classification.

5.3.3.      When the work proceeds well, we think we can detect underlying formations that we conceive of as the unconscious thoughts or scenarios that we call unconscious fantasies, and which are giving shape to the surface material.

5.4.   In my clinical work, this technical thinking takes one of two forms.

5.4.1.      In one type, I regard these unconscious fantasies as versions of what I imagine the patient might have thought as a small child.

5.4.1.1.            An example might be something like, “When you were hospitalized for an appendectomy as a boy of four, you probably thought you were being punished for wishing your baby sister got sick and went away…or for masturbatory fantasies…” or for whatever the analytic material seems to indicate the childs unconscious causal connections to have been.

5.4.1.2.            As in Freuds (1937) “Constructions in Analysis,” a reconstruction of that kind, if offered to the patient as an interpretation, might lead to memories that appear to confirm some such thought, or to related memory material that is consistent with it.

5.4.1.3.            In other situations, the appearance of subsequent analytic material, even without recaptured memories, could serve to establish a sense of conviction in the correctness of the reconstruction.

5.4.1.4.            Needless to add, absent such confirmatory evidence, the analyst must be prepared to reconsider the accuracy of the reconstruction.

<a name="p0125"></a>5.5.   A second variety of construction and interpretation of unconscious fantasies involves, not childhood thinking, but contemporary mental activity. 

5.5.1.      Transference fantasies are probably the most commonly encountered versions of this class of unconscious fantasies.

5.5.2.      Sometimes the analyst detects evidence suggesting some such fantasy, let us say one involving the analysts encouragement, approval, or disapproval of some plan, wish, or action of the patients. 

5.5.3.      Transference fantasies of that kind may exist, but not be verbalized.

5.5.4.      In response to the analysts interpretation, the patient may admit having consciously withheld such a fantasy to avoid possible discomfort.

5.5.5.      In other cases, its presence may be confirmed by the patients subsequent introspective attention, or it is merely reconstructed even though it remains entirely unavailable to the patients consciousness.

5.5.6.      The more difficult it is for the patient to identify and acknowledge these transference fantasies, the more likely I think it is that they resonate with deeply repressed childhood fantasies.

5.6.   Once again, I do not mean my description of the reconstruction and interpretation of unconscious fantasies to give the impression that I think that I or any other analyst is always correct in our formulations, but I will not repeat a description of the criteria by which the accuracy or inaccuracy of the reconstruction is to be determined.

5.6.1.      Neither will I elaborate what has been elsewhere fully outlined, that is to say the centrality in modern conflict theory of regarding compromise formation as the organizing principle of mental life.

5.6.2.      The structure of unconscious fantasies follows this organizing principle, and the constituent elements of which the fantasies are composed can be dissected and identified accordingly by following the usual psychoanalytic method.

5.7.   It is, on the other hand, worthwhile to restate that clinical material is, as a rule, richly textured and characterized by complex layering. 

5.7.1.      Unconscious fantasies dealing with the same or similar conflicts may appear in altered form in the course of an analysis, reflecting different developmental capabilities, and the influence of varied external circumstances.

5.7.2.      Also, some fantasies are constructed to modulate, deny, or otherwise defend against other fantasies; wishful fantasies of triumph and success to deal with experiences or fantasies of loss, defeat, humiliation, and the like are a most familiar example of this phenomenon.

5.7.3.      In my work, I am always interested in trying to understand the apparent psychic purposes that are served by the fantasy in question, as well as seeing the nature of the component wishes, defenses, affects, and moral concerns involved in its structure.

5.8.   I remain today as convinced as ever that the impact of childhood instinctual conflicts, shaped in part by experiences both of that period of life and of later ones, are of critical importance in influencing normal and pathological development.

5.8.1.      An analytic search for the compromise formations to which those conflicts give rise, including the network of unconscious fantasies that incorporate and express them, remains the centerpiece of my view of the analytic task.

5.8.2.      I feel less certain than some other analysts seem to be that we have a good understanding of how the relationship contributes to the analytic process and outcome.

5.8.3.      I do include the task of attending as carefully as possible to the task of understanding what the relationship means to each patient, and to track the varied versions of its conscious and unconscious significance as an essential part of the analytic work.

 

6.      Summary

6.1.   The idea that repressed unconscious fantasies influence symptom formation and normal development dates back to the earliest period of Freuds theory and practice.

6.2.   Because of Freuds view of the nature of the unconscious from his formulation of the topographic model, he was not able to satisfactorily reconcile the organized, secondary process characteristics of unconscious fantasies with his conceptualization of the inchoate nature of the unconscious stratum of the mind.

6.3.   Mid-century thinkers, of whom Arlow was the most active, suggested that conscious and unconscious fantasy life constitute a continuum of sorts, with varying degrees of difficulty characterizing and determining their access to consciousness.

6.4.   Arlow emphasized the continuous, ubiquitous role that unconscious fantasy function plays in shaping the panoply of conscious experiences.

6.5.   A host of symptoms, moods, character traits, and other clinical manifestations can be analytically clarified by uncovering the relevant unconscious fantasies that affect them, using the psychoanalytic method to do so.

6.6.   At least equally significant is the finding that mental functions like perception, memory, thinking, judgment, and reality testing are all influenced by unconscious fantasy function.

6.7.   This observation applies to the mental activity of analysts, just as it does to that of their analysands, thus helping to explain the unavoidable subjectivity of analytic work and theorizing.

6.8.   Attention to the contributions of unconscious fantasies to both patients and analysts theories about how analysis cures, and to their ideas about the<a name="p0129"></a> termination of analysis, can have great practical importance for the conduct of analysis.

 

 
 
 
 
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